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I. INTRODUCTION 
Police have conducted searches and seizures of computers and other 
digital devices
1
 for some time.
2
 But the ubiquity, portability, connectivity, 
and processing and storage capacities of contemporary devices
3
 present new 
challenges to the law of search and seizure, including the interpretation and 
application of section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 
which guarantees everyone’s “right to be secure against unreasonable search 
or seizure”.4  
For some, digitization is a grave threat to the socio-legal order. Law 
enforcement officials complain that criminals’ use of technology has 
outstripped the investigative capacity of police and plea for legislators 
and judges to restore the pre-digital status quo.
5
 Privacy advocates also 
                                                                                                             
*  Faculty of Law, University of Alberta. 
1  The terms “computer” and “digital device” are used interchangeably in this paper. In the 
Criminal Code, a “computer system” is defined for various purposes as “a device that, or a group of 
interconnected or related devices one or more of which, (a) contains computer programs or other 
data, and (b) pursuant to computer programs, (i) performs logic and control, and (ii) may perform 
any other function”. This definition would seem to encompass virtually any digital device, including 
desktop, laptop, and tablet computers, mobile phones, and related technologies. Criminal Code, 
R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 342.1(2). 
2  See, e.g., R. v. DeCoste, [1983] N.S.J. No. 516, 60 N.S.R. (2d) 170 (N.S.S.C. (T.D.)) 
(search warrant for computerized hospital records); R. v. Cardoza, [1981] O.J. No. 3258, 61 C.C.C. 
(2d) 412 (Ont. Co. Ct.) (search of computerized telephone records).  
3  See generally Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution 
That Will Transform How We Live, Work, and Think (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2013), 
at 9 (noting that stored information grows four times faster than the world economy, and computer 
processing power nine times faster). 
4  Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
5  See, e.g., Canadian Association of Chiefs of Police, “Police Confirm Canadians’ Top Five 
Fears about Lawful Access” (October 26, 2012), online: <http://www.cacp.ca/media/news/ 
download/1363/Final_CACP_Press_Release_-_Lawful_Access.pdf>; Department of Justice Canada, 
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yearn for restoration, but they claim digitization has been a boon for state 
surveillance and demand legislation and court rulings forestalling Big 
Brother’s advance.6 
The aim of this paper is not to resolve this debate. Indeed, given 
people’s divergent interests7 and dispositions,8 “privacy versus security” 
is likely to be a perpetually polarizing dialectic. But a narrower question 
might be resolved: does digitization require a fundamental conceptual 
overhaul of section 8 doctrine, or is that doctrine reasonably well 
equipped to accommodate the digital revolution?  
I favour the latter response. There is little reason to think that 
digitization requires a radical reinterpretation of section 8.
9
 Technological 
change inevitably influences constitutional interpretation and application.
10
 
But for the most part, the foundation set out by the Supreme Court of 
Canada in digital (and other) section 8 cases over the past two decades 
provides the conceptual and doctrinal tools needed to achieve reasonable 
                                                                                                             
“Summary of Submissions to the Lawful Access Consultation” (April 28, 2003), at 11-19, online: 
<http://www.justice.gc.ca/eng/cons/la-al/sum-res/sum-res.pdf>; Susan Landau, Surveillance or Security?: 
The Risks Posed by New Wiretapping Technologies (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2010), at 7. 
6  See, e.g., Kevin Haggerty, “Methodology as a Knife Fight: The Process, Politics and 
Paradox of Evaluating Surveillance” (2009) 17 Crit. Criminol. 277; Jena McGill & Ian Kerr, 
“Reduction to Absurdity: Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and the Need for Digital 
Enlightenment” (2012) Digital Enlightenment Yearbook 199. 
7  See generally Meredith Kapushion, “Hungry, Hungry HIPPA: When Privacy Regulations 
Go Too Far” (2003) 31 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1483, at 1491: “Consumers have wildly divergent 
preferences based on their individual needs and tempered by the costs they are willing to bear.” 
8  See generally Darhl M. Pedersen & Shelia Frances, “Regional Differences in Privacy 
Preferences” (1990) 66 Psych Reports 731 (reviewing psychological literature finding marked 
differences in privacy preferences depending on numerous personal characteristics and situational 
factors); Ponnurangam Kumaraguru & Lorrie Faith Cranor, “Privacy Indexes: A Survey of Westin’s 
Studies” (2005) Carnegie Mellon University, Institute for Software Research International, online: 
<http://reports-archive.adm.cs.cmu.edu/anon/isri2005/CMU-ISRI-05-138.pdf> (finding shifting 
proportions of U.S. population characterized as “privacy fundamentalists” (approximately one-
quarter to one-third), “privacy pragmatists” (over one-half), and “privacy unconcerned” (around one-
tenth)). As mentioned infra note 127, however, empirical researchers have found that people’s 
survey-expressed privacy preferences are often belied by their observed behaviours. 
9  For commentary taking a more radical approach, see, e.g., Matthew Johnson, “Privacy in 
the Balance: Novel Search Technologies, Reasonable Expectations, and Recalibrating Section 8” 
(2012) Crim. L.Q. 442; Jane Bailey, “Framed by Section 8: Constitutional Protection of Privacy in 
Canada” (2008) Can. J. Crim. & Crim. Jus. 279; Lisa M. Austin, “Information Sharing and the 
‘Reasonable’ Ambiguities of Section 8 of the Charter” (2007) 57 U.T.L.J. 499. 
10  See generally Lawrence H. Tribe, “The Constitution in Cyberspace: Law and Liberty 
Beyond the Electronic Frontier” in David M. Kaplan, ed., Readings in the Philosophy of Technology, 
2d ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009) 309; Thomas Fetzer & Christopher  S. Yoo, “New 
Technologies and Constitutional Law” in Mark Tushnet, Thomas Fleiner & Cheryl Saunders, eds., 
Routledge Handbook of Constitutional Law (New York: Routledge, 2013) 485. 
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accommodations between competing privacy and law enforcement 
interests in the digital era.  
The remainder of the paper consists of five parts. I begin with a brief 
overview of the basic elements of section 8 law. Next, I chronologically 
survey the Supreme Court’s existing “digital section 8” jurisprudence; 
that is, each decision that has addressed allegations that the state has 
violated section 8 in a digital realm. The third part distils three key 
doctrines from these cases that are likely to animate future digital section 
8 decisions: (i) the notion that “computers are different”; (ii) the role of 
contract, statute, and other exogenous norms in shaping privacy 
expectations over information obtained or held by third parties; and (iii) 
the application of the “biographical core” test to “low resolution” private 
information. While there is consensus as to the core meanings of each of 
these doctrines, to varying degrees each suffers from indeterminacy in 
application. I therefore propose refinements to minimize that 
indeterminacy. The fourth part examines, from both descriptive and 
prescriptive perspectives, how these doctrines played out in the Court’s 
most recent digital section 8 decision: R. v. Spencer.
11
 As always, the final 
part concludes. 
II. SECTION 8 IN A NUTSHELL 
Section 8’s basic interpretive architecture is well settled. To establish 
a violation, claimants must demonstrate: first, that a governmental act 
constituted a “search or seizure”; and second, that the search or seizure 
was “unreasonable”.12  
The “search or seizure” question reduces to whether the act intruded 
on the claimant’s “reasonable expectation of privacy”.13 If not, there was 
no “search or seizure” and no violation of section 8.14 Accordingly, 
                                                                                                             
11  [2011] S.J. No. 729, 2011 SKCA 144 (Sask. C.A.) [hereinafter “Spencer”], affd [2014] 
S.C.J. No. 43, 2014 SCC 43 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Spencer SCC”].  
12  See generally Steven Penney, Vincenzo Rondinelli & James Stribopoulos, Criminal 
Procedure in Canada (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2011), at para. 3.25 [hereinafter “Penney, 
Rondinelli & Stribopoulos”]. 
13  Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] S.C.J. No. 36, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at 159 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Dyment, [1988] S.C.J. No. 82, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, at 426 (S.C.C.) hereinafter “Dyment”].  
14  See R. v. Evans, [1996] S.C.J. No. 1, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 8, at para. 11 (S.C.C.), per Sopinka J. 
[hereinafter “Evans”]; R. v. Wise, [1992] S.C.J. No. 16, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 527, at 533 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Wise”]; R. v. M. (A.), [2008] S.C.J. No. 19, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 569, at para. 8 (S.C.C.), per 
Binnie J. [hereinafter “A.M.”].  
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absent any limits imposed by statute or other Charter provisions, the 
investigative technique comprising the act may be used without legal 
restriction, assuming similar factual circumstances.
15
  
If, in contrast, the technique does invade a reasonable expectation of 
privacy, courts can regulate its use under section 8. Specifically, to be 
considered a “reasonable” search, courts may demand that the state actor 
conducting it meet certain conditions, such as obtaining a warrant based 
on probable grounds.
16
 At a minimum, intrusions on reasonable 
expectations of privacy must be “authorized by law”; in other words, 
police must have a specific power to use the technique granted to them 
by legislation or common law.
17
 
III. THE JURISPRUDENCE 
1.  R. v. Plant 
The first digital search case to reach the Supreme Court of Canada 
was R. v. Plant, decided in 1993.
18
 Police received an anonymous tip that 
a residence was being used to grow marijuana. Acting under a pre-
existing arrangement with the local electricity provider, they accessed its 
customer database and discovered that the home was using four times 
more electricity than others of its size. Armed with this and other 
incriminating information, they obtained a warrant to search the home 
and seized marijuana.  
The homeowner argued that by obtaining his electrical consumption 
records, police invaded his reasonable expectation of privacy without legal 
authority and therefore violated section 8 of the Charter. The Court 
disagreed, holding that the information obtained was not sufficiently 
                                                                                                             
15  See generally, R. v. Duarte, [1990] S.C.J. No. 2, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 30, at 42 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Duarte”]; R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, at 47 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Gomboc, [2010] S.C.J. No. 55, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211, at para. 20 (S.C.C.), per Deschamps J. 
16  I use the “probable grounds” as shorthand for the standard that courts and legislatures 
have termed “reasonable and probable grounds” or “reasonable grounds”. In some cases courts have 
permitted searches on the basis of a lower standard termed “reasonable suspicion”. See Penney, 
Rondinelli & Stribopoulos, supra, note 12, at paras. 3.132-3.140. 
17  See R. v. Collins, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at 278 (S.C.C.); R. v. 
Caslake, [1998] S.C.J. No. 3, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 51, at paras. 10-12 (S.C.C.); R. v. Cole, [2012] S.C.J. 
No. 53, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 34, at para. 64 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Cole”]. 
18  [1993] S.C.J. No. 97, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 281 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Plant”]. 
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“personal and confidential” to attract a reasonable expectation of privacy.19 
Writing for the (6:1) majority, Sopinka J. elaborated as follows: 
In fostering the underlying values of dignity, integrity and autonomy, it 
is fitting that s. 8 of the Charter should seek to protect a biographical 
core of personal information which individuals in a free and democratic 
society would wish to maintain and control from dissemination to the 
state. This would include information which tends to reveal intimate 
details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual.  
The computer records investigated in the case at bar while revealing the 
pattern of electricity consumption in the residence cannot reasonably be 
said to reveal intimate details of the appellant’s life since electricity 
consumption reveals very little about the personal lifestyle or private 
decisions of the occupant of the residence.
20
 
Justice Sopinka further noted that the relationship between Mr. Plant 
and the provider was not confidential, the records were kept for the 
utility’s own commercial purposes, and there were no contractual terms 
prohibiting disclosure to police.
21
 To obtain the information, he added, 
police did not have to intrude “into places ordinarily considered private”.22  
In her concurring opinion, McLachlin J. (as she then was) would 
have held that the records did attract a reasonable expectation of 
privacy.
23
 For her, the records told much about “one’s personal lifestyle, 
such as how many people lived in the house and what sort of activities 
were probably taking place there”, including the fact that marijuana was 
being grown.
24
 She also took issue with Sopinka J.’s conclusion that the 
search was non-intrusive. “Computers may contain a wealth of personal 
information,” she argued, and the information they store “may be as 
private as any found in a dwelling house or hotel room.”25 Lastly, she 
downplayed the importance of the lack of any contractual prohibition on 
disclosure, stating that “the question is not so much whether the 
relationship is one of confidence, so much as whether the particular 
records disclose a reasonable expectation of confidence”.26 
                                                                                                             
19  Id., at 293. 
20  Id., at 293-94. 
21  Id., at 294. 
22  Id. 
23  Justice McLachlin concurred in the result because she found that there was sufficient 
evidence, apart from the electricity records, to support the issuance of the warrant. Id., at 304. 
24  Id., at 302-303. 
25  Id., at 303-304. 
26  Id., at 303. 
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2.  R. v. Morelli 
Apart from one very brief affirming decision,
27
 the next section 8 
digital privacy case did not arise until 2010, when the Court released  
R. v. Morelli.
28
 The key issue there (whether police had sufficient grounds 
to obtain a warrant to search a suspect’s personal computer for child 
pornography) is not relevant to this paper. It was not disputed that the 
suspect had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer’s 
contents.
29
 By 2010, it would have been shocking had even one judge 
concluded otherwise.
30
  
The Court’s divergent pronouncements about the consequences of 
digitization, however, are revealing. At the beginning of his majority 
reasons, Fish J. signalled that the Court was cognizant of the especial 
importance of privacy in the digital age:  
It is difficult to imagine a search more intrusive, extensive, or invasive 
of one’s privacy than the search and seizure of a personal computer. 
First, police officers enter your home, take possession of your computer, 
and carry it off for examination in a place unknown and inaccessible to 
you. There, without supervision or constraint, they scour the entire contents 
of your hard drive: your emails sent and received; accompanying 
attachments; your personal notes and correspondence; your meetings and 
appointments; your medical and financial records; and all other saved 
documents that you have downloaded, copied, scanned, or created. The 
police scrutinize as well the electronic roadmap of your cybernetic 
                                                                                                             
27  Smith v. Canada (Attorney General), [2001] S.C.J. No. 85, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 902 (S.C.C.), 
affg [2000] F.C.J. No. 174, 252 N.R. 172 (F.C.A.), affg CUB-44824 (UIC Umpire) (reasonable 
expectation of privacy not breached when government unemployment insurance commission 
obtained claimant’s travel records from customs agency through “data-match” program). 
28  [2010] S.C.J. No. 8, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 253 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Morelli”]. 
29  Because the issue was not in dispute, the Court did not explicitly state that personal 
computers carried a reasonable expectation of privacy. But as the Court stated in Cole, supra, note 
17, at para. 1, Morelli “left no doubt” on the issue. 
30  Recall that in her concurring reasons in Plant, supra, note 18, at 303-304, McLachlin J. 
observed that computers may contain a great deal of personal information. Note as well that the 
Court has repeatedly referred to a 1972 government report on computer privacy. See Task Force on 
Privacy and Computers, Privacy and Computers: A Report of a Task Force Established Jointly by 
Dept. of Communications/Dept. of Justice (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1972); R. v. Lyons, [1984] 
S.C.J. No. 63, [1984] 2 S.C.R 633, at 688 (S.C.C.); Dyment, supra, note 13, at paras. 19, 21, 29; 
Plant, id., at 292; R. v. Law, [2002] S.C.J. No. 10, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 227, at para. 16 (S.C.C.);  
R. v. Tessling, [2004] S.C.J. No. 63, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432, at para. 23 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Tessling”]; Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. United Food and Commercial 
Workers, Local 401, [2013] S.C.J. No. 62, 2013 SCC 62, at para. 21 (S.C.C.). 
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peregrinations, where you have been and what you appear to have seen on 
the Internet — generally by design, but sometimes by accident.31  
Justice Deschamps’ dissenting opinion also began with a comment 
on the “tremendous changes” wrought by “[i]nternet and computer 
technologies”.32 But, rather than stressing digitization’s threat to privacy, 
she emphasized its capacity to “facilitate the communication of 
information and the exchange of material of all kinds and forms, with 
both legal and illegal content, and in infinite quantities.”33 “No one can 
be unaware today”, she added, “that these technologies have accelerated 
the proliferation of child pornography because they make it easier to 
produce, distribute and access material in partial anonymity”.34  
3.  R. v. Gomboc 
Also decided in 2010, R. v. Gomboc
35
 was the sequel to Plant. As in 
Plant, police suspected that a home was being used as a grow-op and 
wished to measure its electricity consumption. But, instead of obtaining 
billing records from the provider, they asked it to install a digital 
recording ammeter (“DRA”) on the power line connected to the house. 
The provider complied, placing the DRA outside the home’s property 
line. Compared to the billing records in Plant, the DRA provided more 
detailed, hourly usage data that enabled police to make stronger 
correlations with the cyclical usage patterns typical of grow-ops.
36
  
A majority of the Court found that the DRA did not invade the 
homeowner’s reasonable expectation of privacy. It divided, however, on 
the reasons for this conclusion. For the plurality, Deschamps J. held that 
the case could not be distinguished from Plant. Though the DRA 
produced more fine-grained measurements, it did not reveal intimate 
details of household activities.
37
 The fact that the information came from 
                                                                                                             
31  Morelli, supra, note 28, at paras. 2-3. 
32  Id., at para. 114. 
33  Id. 
34  Id. (internal citation omitted). 
35  [2010] S.C.J. No. 55, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 211 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gomboc”]. 
36  Id., at paras. 5, 38. The officer who testified about DRAs stated that of approximately 400 
cases where DRA data was used to obtain a search warrant, grow-op evidence was found in all but 
one. Id., at para. 69, Abella J., concurring. DRAs can also provide accurate consumption information 
when conventional metering has been manipulated to thwart criminal investigation and defraud the 
provider. See, e.g., R. v. Cheung, [2005] S.J. No. 474, 2005 SKQB 283, at para. 6 (Sask. Q.B.). 
37  Gomboc, supra, note 35, at paras. 7-15, 36-40.  
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a home (normally a realm of strong privacy expectation
38
) did not trump 
this fact.
39
 In her view, the evidence established that “there was 
absolutely no reliable inference to be made concerning the occupants or 
their activities in the house besides the grow operation”.40 And while the 
criminal nature of concealed activity does in itself disqualify it from 
section 8’s protections, she stressed, the focus of the inquiry is not the 
“nature or identity of the concealed items” but rather the “potential 
impact of the search on the person [or thing] being searched”.41  
Further, she noted, police access to electrical consumption data was 
permitted by the governing legislative regime. The relevant regulation 
allowed disclosure of customer information to police absent the 
customer’s express request that it remain confidential (which the 
homeowner did not make).
42
 Though this legislation was not “sufficient 
to erode the expectation of privacy”, she concluded, it “weighed heavily 
against giving the asserted expectation of privacy constitutional 
recognition”.43 She was careful to state, however, that given the great 
diversity of information “generated in customer relationships” and given 
that such relationships “are often governed by contracts of adhesion”, 
courts should exercise caution in deciding the constitutional effect of 
legislative disclosure clauses.
44
 
Justice Abella agreed that there was no reasonable expectation of 
privacy. But she would have found otherwise but for the disclosure 
clause.
45
 For her, any information from “inside the home” is 
“presumptively” protected by a reasonable expectation of privacy.46 The 
fact that the information reliably predicted the presence of a grow-op was 
enough to demonstrate the DRA’s invasiveness.47 She took an even 
stronger view than Deschamps J., however, on the Regulation’s effect on 
                                                                                                             
38  Id., at para. 45. See also Evans, supra, note 14; R. v. Silveira, [1995] S.C.J. No. 38, 
[1995] 2 S.C.R. 297 (S.C.C.); R. v. Feeney, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13 
(S.C.C.);Tessling, supra, note 30; R. v. Patrick, [2009] S.C.J. No. 17, [2009] 1 S.C.R. 579 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Patrick”]. 
39  Gomboc, id., at para. 50. 
40  Id., at para. 7. 
41  Id., at para. 39, quoting Patrick, supra, note 38, at para. 32. 
42  Code of Conduct Regulation, Alta. Reg. 160/2003, s. 10(3)(f): permitting disclosure of 
customer information “to a peace officer for the purpose of investigating an offence if the disclosure 
is not contrary to the express request of the customer”.  
43  Gomboc, supra, note 35, at paras. 32-33. 
44  Id., at para. 33. 
45  Id., at paras. 82-95. 
46  Id., at para. 80. 
47  Id., at para. 81.  
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the homeowner’s expectation of privacy. Because he had an “unrestricted 
ability” to control the release of information,48 she concluded, any 
subjective expectation of privacy he may have had was not objectively 
reasonable.
49
  
Having dissented in Plant, it is not surprising that McLachlin C.J.C. 
did the same in Gomboc. Writing with Fish J., she agreed with Abella J.’s 
assessment of the DRA’s invasiveness.50 In addition to reliably revealing 
the presence of a grow-up,
51
 they asserted, it enabled predictions about 
other “probable activities taking place within a home”,52 including 
“whether anyone is home, the approximate time at which the occupants 
go to bed and wake up, and guesses as to particular appliances being 
used”.53 A surveillance technique need not be capable of making 
“conclusive determinations” of residential activity to trigger a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, they reasoned.
54
 It is enough that it enables 
“informed predictions” conveying “useful private information to the 
police”.55 Unlike Abella J., however, they concluded that legislation did 
not extinguish the homeowner’s reasonable expectation of privacy.56  
A reasonable person could not have been expected to know that the 
legislation existed, let alone that it would be interpreted to permit the 
release of detailed electrical consumption data.
57
  
4.  R. v. Cole 
The Court’s next digital section 8 decision was 2012’s R. v. Cole.58 
There, it had to decide whether a teacher had a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in a computer issued to him by his employer. While conducting 
routine maintenance, a school technician discovered nude photographs of 
a student on the computer. The technician notified the principal, who 
instructed him to make copies of the photos. The principal seized the 
                                                                                                             
48  Id., at para. 85. 
49  Id., at para. 95. 
50  Id., at paras. 105, 124, 129.  
51  Id., at para. 129. 
52  Id., at para. 128. 
53  Id. 
54  Id., at para. 125. 
55  Id., at para. 124 (emphasis in original). 
56  Id., at paras. 138-142. 
57  Id., at paras. 139-140. See also Lisa Austin, “Getting Past Privacy? Surveillance, the 
Charter, and the Rule of Law” (2012) 27 Can. J.L. & Soc’y 381, at 394.  
58  Supra, note 17. 
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computer, school board technicians made copies of temporary Internet 
files found on it, and both the computer and the copied files were sent to 
the police. Police examined the material and conducted a further forensic 
search of the computer.  
Writing for a unanimous Court on this issue, Fish J. noted that the 
robust expectation of privacy ordinarily attaching to computer data was 
tempered by a number of factors, including the board’s announced 
ownership of the device and its contents, the teacher’s lack of exclusive 
access or control, the school’s publicized policy of monitoring usage, and 
its explicit warning that computer data was not private.
59
  
The Court nonetheless concluded that the teacher maintained a 
reasonable expectation of privacy. That expectation did not prevent his 
employer from either inspecting the computer in the course of routine 
maintenance or, once the photographs were found, searching it for school 
safety reasons.
60
 But it did require police to obtain a warrant before 
examining the computer and its data. Despite its ownership, policies, and 
warnings, Fish J. observed, the school allowed the teacher to use the 
computer for “personal purposes”.61 “[R]egardless of where they are 
found or to whom they belong”, he continued, computers “used for 
personal purposes” reveal intimate information about financial, medical, 
and personal matters as well as people’s “specific interests, likes, and 
propensities”.62 This is especially true, he wrote, of devices connected to 
the Internet.
63
 
5.  R. v. Vu 
Most recently, the Court issued its decision in R. v. Vu.
64
 There, it had 
to decide whether police could search computers and a cell phone found 
by police searching a residence under a warrant authorizing, among other 
things, a search for documents. Though the warrant did not specifically 
authorize any computer searches,
65
 under conventional law this would 
not have been a problem. Warrants to search places (such as residences) 
                                                                                                             
59  Id., at paras. 8, 15-17, 50, 55-56. 
60  Id., at paras. 61-62. 
61  Id., at para. 54. 
62  Id., at para. 47, quoting in part Morelli, supra, note 28, at para. 105. 
63  Id. 
64  [2013] S.C.J. No. 60, 2013 SCC 60 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Vu”]. 
65  Id., at para. 4. 
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for things (such as documents) do not normally need to specify the 
location or container in which those things may be found.
66
  
The Court concluded, however, that computers and mobile phones
67
 
were not analogous to “cupboards or filing cabinets”.68 Highlighting 
contemporary computers’ massive storage capacities and the great 
diversity of intimate information they contain, Cromwell J. held for a 
unanimous Court that section 8’s reasonableness requirement mandates 
specific, prior authorization to search computers.
69
 If police find a 
computer (presumably in plain view
70
) while executing a warrant without 
such an authorization, they may seize it if they reasonably believe it 
contains evidence related to an offence.
71
 But they may not search it 
unless they first obtain a specific warrant to do so.
72
 
The Court was not willing, however, to proclaim a general rule 
requiring issuing judges to impose conditions dictating how computer 
searches should be conducted to limit unnecessary privacy invasions.
73
 
Requiring such conditions, Cromwell J. reasoned, would “likely add 
significant complexity and practical difficulty”.74 Claimants can 
challenge the reasonableness of computer searches ex post, however, 
and the rules emerging from these decisions may guide police on how 
to limit searches in future cases.
75
 After-the-fact review, he added, may 
also spur future courts to develop rules constraining computer searches 
ex ante.
76
 Lastly, given the complexity of the issue and the rapid rate of 
                                                                                                             
66  Id., at paras. 23, 39. 
67  Notably, the Court concluded that contemporary mobile phones were equivalent to 
computers in terms of their storage and other capacities. All references to computers were thus 
specifically defined to include mobile phones. Id., at para. 38. 
68  Id., at para. 24. 
69  Id., at paras. 40-48.  
70  On the requirements of plain view seizures, see Penney, Rondinelli & Stribopoulos, 
supra, note 12, at paras. 3.220-3.227.  
71  Vu, supra, note 64, at para. 49. 
72  Id. 
73  Id., at paras. 53-62.  
74  Id., at paras. 57-58 (noting the difficulty that U.S. courts have had in developing a 
consensus on how computer searches should be restrained ex ante). 
75  Id., at para. 55. 
76  Id. Given that the Court was itself unwilling to proclaim any such rules, this statement is 
somewhat perplexing. Perhaps it is best understood as expressing an unwillingness, given the 
evidence on the record, to impose general, ex ante rules at the present time. But Cromwell J. did 
appear to contemplate the gradual imposition of such rules over time. See id., at para. 62: “I would 
not foreclose the possibility that our developing understanding of computer searches and changes in 
technology may make it appropriate to impose search protocols in a broader range of cases in the 
future. Without expressing any firm opinion on these points, it is conceivable that proceeding in this 
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technological innovation, he suggested that Parliament might wish to 
intervene to tackle the issue “more comprehensively”.77 
IV. KEY DOCTRINES 
Three key doctrines can be discerned in the cases that are likely to 
provide the foundation for future digital privacy decisions.  
1.  Computers Are Different 
The first and most elemental doctrine, illustrated by Morelli and Vu, 
is that computers are “different”; in other words, the capacities of digital 
devices differ, often by several orders of magnitude, from their non-
digital counterparts.
78
 Simply put, computers typically contain both a 
vastly greater quantity and a vastly greater variety of personal 
information than their analogue counterparts. For example, digital 
devices often contain extensive records of communications content (text 
messages, e-mail and the like). Though non-digital “information 
containers” (such as briefcases, filing cabinets and notebooks) may 
contain personal communications (such as letters, calendars, and diary 
entries), the volume and diversity of information they hold is in no way 
comparable to that found on digital devices.
79
 Indeed, the magnitude of 
communications content that may be extracted from digital devices may 
in some cases exceed that obtained through prospective communications 
                                                                                                             
way may be appropriate in some circumstances.” Note, as well, that issuing judges are required to 
impose conditions on the execution of searches on a case-by-case basis when necessary to ensure 
reasonableness under s. 8. See generally Baron  v. Canada, [1993] S.C.J. No. 6, [1993] 1 S.C.R. 416 
(S.C.C.); Descôteaux v. Mierzwinski, [1982] S.C.J. No. 43, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 860 (S.C.C.). Alluding 
to this requirement, Cromwell J. suggested in Vu that in some cases “authorizing justices may find it 
practical to impose conditions when police first request authorization to search. In others, they might 
prefer a two-stage approach where they would first issue a warrant authorizing the seizure of a 
computer and then have police return for an additional authorization to search the seized device.” Id., 
at para. 62. 
77  Vu, id., at para. 56. 
78  See Daniel M. Scanlan, “Issues in Digital Evidence and Privacy: Enhanced Expectations 
of Privacy and Appellate Lag Times” (2012) 16 Can. Crim. L. Rev. 301, at 307-308 [hereinafter 
“Scanlan”]. 
79  Id., at 308. See also R. v. Fearon, [2013] O.J. No. 704, 2013 ONCA 106, at para. 61  
(Ont. C.A.), appeal heard and reserved May 23, 2014, [2013] S.C.C.A. No. 141 (S.C.C.): observing 
that mobile phones are “sophisticated devices which have a capacity for storing an infinite variety 
and amount of personal information in which there is a high expectation of privacy by the owner”. 
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surveillance (i.e., wiretaps),
80
 which can only be conducted under 
onerous conditions exceeding those applicable to “ordinary” search 
warrants.
81
  
That said, as discussed below in relation to the Spencer case, it can be 
dangerous to ascribe capacities to digital search technologies that they do 
not in fact possess. Judges must strive to understand the actual capacities 
of the privacy-invasive technologies before them, not speculative or 
theoretical capacities stemming from hype, misinformation or fear.
82
  
2.  Third Party Information and Extrinsic Norms  
The starting point for this doctrine, exemplified by Plant and 
Gomboc, is the principle that reasonable privacy expectations may 
survive the disclosure of personal information to third parties. For those 
steeped in section 8 law, this proposition is neither novel nor 
controversial. But it is far from self-evident. In the United States, the so-
called “third party doctrine” dictates that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in information voluntarily or necessarily given to 
others, regardless of its inherent sensitivity or any conditions on 
disclosure imposed or expected by the subject.
83
 As a consequence, vast 
troves of personal information (increasingly held in searchable, digital 
form) receive no constitutional protection.
84
  
Presciently, the Supreme Court of Canada rejected this doctrine at an 
early stage of its section 8 jurisprudence. In Plant, Sopinka and 
                                                                                                             
80  See Scanlan, id., at 308. 
81  Criminal Code, Part VI. See generally Steven Penney, “Updating Canada’s 
Communications Surveillance Laws: Privacy and Security in the Digital Age” (2008) 12 Can. Crim. 
L. Rev. 115, at 118-21. 
82  See generally Paul Ohm, “The Myth of the Superuser: Fear, Risk, and Harm Online” 
(2008) U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1327 (experts in digital and Internet technology often exaggerate risks of 
harm). See also Timothy Caulfield, “Biotechnology and the Popular Press: Hype and the Selling of 
Sciences” (2004) 22 Trends in Biotechnology 337 (exploring legal implications of media-generated 
hype surrounding genetic technologies). 
83  See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (banking records); Smith v. Maryland, 
442 U.S. 735 (1979) (telephone records). See also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) 
(plurality) (no expectation of privacy when defendant communicates with informant surreptitiously 
carrying a “wire” transmitting conversations to police). Recently, however, some members of the 
Court have questioned the wisdom of retaining this doctrine in the digital era. See United States v. 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. 949 (2012), Sotomayor J.  
84  See Christopher Slobogin, Privacy at Risk: The New Government Surveillance and the 
Fourth Amendment (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), at 151-64; Susan W. Brenner & 
Leo L. Clarke, “Fourth Amendment Protection for Shared Privacy Rights in Stored Transactional 
Data” (2006) 14 J.L. & Pol’y 211. 
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McLachlin JJ. both quoted from Dyment,
85
 where La Forest J. opined that 
that “situations abound where the reasonable expectations of the individual 
that the information shall remain confidential to the persons to whom, and 
restricted to the purposes for which it is divulged, must be protected”.86 In 
other words, though a person may impart confidential information to 
another for particular, instrumental reasons, the state should not be wholly 
free to conscript that information for its own purposes.
87
  
This principle becomes especially important as more and more 
personal information is digitized, recorded, and stored in myriad 
searchable databases. Without some assurance that at least some of this 
information is protected from disclosure to government, people may lose 
trust in institutions and relationships, refrain from socially beneficial (but 
potentially stigmatizing) communications or activities, or deploy 
wasteful non-legal mechanisms to protect their privacy.
88
  
But while a third party’s possession of personal information does not 
preclude Charter protection, the nature of the relationship between the 
parties (including any governing contractual or legislative norms) may 
diminish or even extinguish privacy expectations. In Plant, for example, 
Sopinka J. noted that the commercial nature of the data and the lack of 
contractual terms restricting disclosure militated against section 8 
protection.
89
 Likewise in Gomboc, Abella J. (and to a lesser extent 
Deschamps J.) pointed to the legislative default disclosure rule in 
concluding that the claimant’s expectation of privacy was unreasonable. 
In Cole, in contrast, the Court held that given the sensitivity of the 
                                                                                                             
85  Dyment, supra, note 13, at 429-30.  
86  See generally Duarte, supra, note 15 (reasonable expectation that private conversations 
not intercepted or recorded by state, even if one party aware of surveillance); Cole, supra, note 17, at 
paras. 67-73. 
87  See Dyment, supra, note 13, at 431-32 (reasonable expectation of privacy retained for bodily 
samples taken by medical personnel); R. v. Colarusso, [1994] S.C.J. No. 2, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 20, at para. 
70 (S.C.C.) (blood samples held by coroner); R. v. O’Connor, [1995] S.C.J. No. 98, [1995] 4 S.C.R. 
411, at para. 99 (S.C.C.) (records held by counsellors); Lavallee, Rackel & Heintz v. Canada (Attorney 
General); White, Ottenheimer & Baker v. Canada (Attorney General); R. v. Fink, [2002] S.C.J. No. 61, 
[2002] 3 S.C.R. 209, at para. 35 (S.C.C.) (records held by lawyers); R. v. Dersch, [1993] S.C.J. No. 116, 
[1993] 3 S.C.R. 768, at 778 (S.C.C.) (records held by physicians). 
88  See Dyment, supra, note 13, at 433-34. For more detailed versions of this argument, see 
Steven Penney, “Reasonable Expectations of Privacy and Novel Search Technologies: An Economic 
Approach” (2007) 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 477 [hereinafter “Penney, ‘Novel Search 
Technologies’”]; Steven Penney, “Conceptions of Privacy: A Comment on R. v. Kang-Brown and  
R. v. A.M.” (2008) 46 Alta. L. Rev. 203; Tracey M. Bailey & Steven Penney, “Healing not Squealing: 
Recent Amendments to Alberta’s Health Information Act” (2007) 15 Health L. Rev. 3, at 8 [hereinafter 
“Bailey & Penney”]. 
89  Supra, note 18. 
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information at issue and the school board’s acquiescence to personal use 
of its computers, the board’s ownership and regulation of the claimant’s 
computer data did not wholly defeat his privacy interest.
90
  
Though these cases can be distinguished from one another, an 
emerging consensus can be distilled. To begin, section 8 sets out 
normative limitations on state power; its scope cannot therefore be 
(entirely) dictated by exogenous norms like statute or contract. As 
Deschamps J. put it in Gomboc: 
[T]he fact that the person claiming an expectation of privacy in 
information ought to have known that the terms governing the 
relationship with the holder of that information allowed disclosure may 
not be determinative. Rather, the appropriate question is whether the 
information is the sort that society accepts should remain out of  
the state’s hands because of what it reveals about the person involved, 
the reasons why it was collected, and the circumstances in which it was 
intended to be used.
91
 
Second, statute and contract are less likely to extinguish expectations 
of privacy over information that is intrinsically intimate. As McLachlin 
C.J.C. and Fish J. stated in Gomboc, “legislation is only one factor that is 
to be considered when determining whether an expectation of privacy is 
objectively reasonable and it may be insufficient to negate an expectation 
of privacy that is otherwise particularly compelling”.92 
This is a sensible approach. Consider the consequences of failing to 
recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in Cole. Employer-issued 
digital devices have become ubiquitous, and employees commonly use 
them for personal purposes. Unrestricted state access to data from such 
devices could have many pernicious consequences, such as dissuading 
                                                                                                             
90  Supra, note 17. 
91  Gomboc, supra, note 35, at para. 34. See also Tessling, supra, note 30, at para. 42: 
“Expectation of privacy is a normative rather than a descriptive standard”; Patrick, supra, note 38, at 
para. 14; R. v. Wong, [1990] S.C.J. No. 118, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 36, at 46 (S.C.C.): the fundamental 
question in s. 8 cases is “whether giving their sanction to the particular form of unauthorized 
surveillance in question would see the amount of privacy and freedom remaining to citizens 
diminished to a compass inconsistent with the aims of a free and open society”; Anthony 
Amsterdam, “Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment” (1974) 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, at 402. 
92  Gomboc, id., at para. 115. Of course, legislative provisions permitting such disclosures 
are themselves subject to scrutiny under s. 8. See generally, id., at para. 58, per Deschamps J. 
(noting that the legislation was not subject to a Charter challenge); Royal Bank v. Welton, [2009] 
O.J. No. 209, 306 D.L.R. (4th) 487 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2009] S.C.C.A. No. 111 
(S.C.C.) (rejecting s. 8, Charter challenge of disclosure exceptions in private sector privacy 
legislation). 
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people from engaging in socially productive and personally fulfilling 
communications and activities and inducing them to adopt costly and 
wasteful measures to preserve their privacy.
93
  
Equally important, the costs to law enforcement of recognizing a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in workplace devices are marginal. As 
the Court noted in Cole, employers retain considerable scope to monitor 
devices and investigate work-related wrongdoing.
94
 When such 
monitoring or investigation uncovers clear evidence of criminal activity, 
police will normally have little trouble obtaining a warrant to seize this 
evidence or conduct further searches.  
3.  The Biographical Core Test and “Low Resolution” Information 
This still leaves the question of how to judge whether information is 
so intrinsically intimate as to be presumptively deserving of 
constitutional protection. As discussed, in Plant, the Court set out the 
“biographical core” test to answer this question. Like so many broadly 
stated, pragmatically grounded legal standards, the test works well in 
most situations. Everyone would agree that information about people’s 
sexual, religious and political preferences
95
 is more deserving of 
protection than information about their allegiances to sports teams. Nor 
would many dispute that (all other things being equal) information about 
residential activity is more intimate than behaviour conducted in public 
spaces, like driving or shopping.
96
  
But as Plant and Gomboc illustrate, jurists often disagree about how 
to characterize investigative techniques that reveal “low resolution” 
information. Standing alone, such information may reveal little about 
intimate activity. But by viewing it in conjunction with other data, police 
may be able to determine (or at least infer the existence of) more 
                                                                                                             
93  See Steven Penney, “Unreasonable Search and Seizure and Section 8 of the Charter: 
Cost-benefit Analysis in Constitutional Interpretation” in Errol Mendes & Stéphane Beaulac, eds., 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 5th ed. (Markham, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2013) 751, 
at 755-57 [hereinafter “Penney, ‘Cost-benefit’”]. 
94  The Court declined to comment on the implications of its decision for the rights of 
employers to monitor computers issued to employees. Cole, supra, note 17, at para. 60. 
95  See Patrick, supra, note 38, at para. 30, per Binnie J. and at para. 76, per Abella J., 
concurring; Gomboc, supra, note 35, at para. 7, Deschamps J. and at para. 121, McLachlin C.J.C. 
and Fish J., dissenting. 
96  See, e.g., Wise, supra, note 14 (weaker expectation of privacy in vehicles than residences). 
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sensitive behaviour.
97
 The debate over this kind of information centres on 
two related points: (i) the nature of the probabilistic inferences that can 
be drawn from the information (i.e., whether police can infer the 
presence of intimate activity with reasonable reliability); and (ii) the 
relative merits of brighter or dimmer lines demarcating protected from 
unprotected information (e.g., whether all information about residential 
activity should be protected, even if it does not permit reliable inferences 
in the case at hand).
98
 
Elsewhere, I have argued how these debates should have been 
resolved in Plant, Gomboc and other existing Supreme Court decisions.
99
 
Below, I discuss on how they played out in Spencer. 
V. R. V. SPENCER: IS THERE A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF 
PRIVACY IN SUBSCRIBER INFORMATION? 
1.  Background 
The issue in Spencer
100
 was whether the “subscriber” information 
associated with electronic communications attracts a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. Police often need this information to obtain 
warrants to acquire electronic communications content or metadata.
101
 
As in many of the cases on this question, in Spencer, police 
determined that someone using a particular Internet Protocol (“IP”) 
address was trading child pornography online. Using a publicly available 
database, they traced the address to Shaw Communications, a major 
Internet service provider.
102
 Police wrote to Shaw requesting the identity 
of the subscriber associated with that address, purportedly in accordance 
with section 7(3)(c.1)(ii) of the Personal Information Protection and 
                                                                                                             
97  See generally Orin S. Kerr, “The Mosiac Theory of the Fourth Amendment” (2012) 110 
Mich. L. Rev. 311. For non-digital Supreme Court cases wrestling with this issue, see Tessling, 
supra, note 30. See also Penney, “Cost-benefit”, supra, note 93, at 762-67. 
98  See also Tessling, supra, note 30, at para. 34. 
99  Penney, “Cost-benefit”, supra, note 93. 
100  Supra, note 11. 
101  See Robert W. Hubbard, Susan Magotiaux & Xenia Proestos, “The Limits of Privacy: 
Police Access to Subscriber Information in Canada” (2002) 46 Crim. L.Q. 361, at 372-73 
[hereinafter “Hubbard, Magotiaux & Proestos”]. 
102  See also R. v. Ward, [2012] O.J. No. 4587, 2012 ONCA 660, at paras. 25-26 (Ont. C.A.) 
[hereinafter “Ward”]. 
522 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
Electronic Documents Act.
103
 As have most providers in similar 
circumstances,
104
 Shaw complied, disclosing the name and billing 
information of the appellant’s sister. After using this information to 
obtain a search warrant, police discovered an extensive cache of child 
pornography on the appellant’s computer. The appellant asserted that the 
warrantless disclosure of the subscriber information violated section 8 of 
the Charter. The Crown countered, and the trial court agreed, that the 
disclosure was not a search or seizure because the subscriber information 
did not attract a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Reflecting the divisions about this question in other courts,
105
 in 
Spencer, the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal divided in three ways.
106
 
                                                                                                             
103  S.C. 2000, c. 5 [hereinafter “PIPEDA”] (stating that organizations may disclose personal 
information without consent if police have identified their “lawful authority to obtain the 
information and indicated that … the disclosure is requested for the purpose of enforcing any law of 
Canada …”). Some jurists have interpreted “lawful authority” as requiring police to have a warrant 
or other compulsive process to obtain personal information under this provision. See, e.g., Re C. (S.), 
[2006] O.J. No. 3754, 2006 ONCJ 343 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Mahmood, [2008] O.J. No. 3922, 236 C.C.C. 
(3d) 3 (Ont. S.C.J.). Most courts have rightly rejected this argument, noting (among other things) 
that such an interpretation would make s. 7(3)(c) of the Act (which permits disclosure when 
compelled by subpoena, warrant or court order) redundant. See, e.g., R. v. Kwok, [2008] O.J. No. 
2414, at para. 32 (Ont. C.J.) [hereinafter “Kwok”]; R. v. Brousseau, [2010] O.J. No. 5793, 2010 
ONSC 6753, at paras. 41-45 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. McNeice, [2010] B.C.J. No. 2131, 2010 BCSC 1544, 
at para. 43 (B.C.S.C.); R. v. Trapp, [2012] S.J. No. 778, [2012] 4 W.W.R. 648, at paras. 114-118 
(Sask. C.A.), per Ottenbreit J.A. [hereinafter “Trapp”]. See also Suzanne Morin, “Updated: Business 
Disclosure of Personal Information to Law Enforcement Agencies: PIPEDA and the CNA Letter of 
Request Protocol”, Privacy Pages: CBA National and Privacy Access Law Section Newsletter 
(November 2011), at 3-8, online: <http://www.cba.org/cba/newsletters-sections/pdf/2011-11-
privacy1.pdf> [hereinafter “Morin”] (examining provision’s legislative history). 
104  See Morin, id.; Ward, supra, note 102, at paras. 37-38; Andrea Slane, “Privacy and Civic 
Duty in R. v. Ward: The Right to Online Anonymity and the Charter-Compliant Scope of Voluntary 
Cooperation with Police Requests” (2013) 39 Queen’s L.J. 301, at 303. 
105  To date, the only other provincial court of appeal to deal with the issue has been 
Ontario’s, which ruled in Ward, id., that the subscriber information associated with an IP address did 
not attract a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances. Trial courts have split on the 
question, with most finding no expectation of privacy. For a sample of decisions finding no 
expectation of privacy in IP subscriber information, see R. v. Friers, [2008] O.J. No. 5646, 2008 
ONCJ 740 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. Wilson, [2009] O.J. No. 1067 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. McGarvie, [2009] O.J. 
No. 6417 (Ont. C.J.); R. v. McNeice, [2010] B.C.J. No. 2131, 2010 BCSC 1544 (B.C.S.C.);  
R. v. Brousseau, [2010] O.J. No. 5793, 2010 ONSC 6753 (Ont. S.C.J.); R. v. Vasic, [2009] O.J. No. 1968 
(Ont. S.C.J.). Decisions going the other way include R. v. Cuttell, [2009] O.J. No. 4053, 2009 ONCJ 
471 (Ont. C.J.); Kwok, supra, note 103; and Re C. (S.), supra, note 103. For decisions on other types 
of subscriber information, see, e.g., R. v. Hutchings, [1996] B.C.J. No. 3060, 111 C.C.C. (3d) 215, at 
paras. 22-26 (B.C.C.A.) (declining to find a reasonable expectation of privacy in telephone numbers, 
but noting that there was no evidence that the suspect’s number was unlisted); R. v. Brown, [2000] 
O.J. No. 1177, at para. 63 (Ont. S.C.J.) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in mobile phone 
subscriber records); R. v. Pervez, [2005] A.J. No. 708 (Alta. C.A.) (same); R. v. Stucky, [2006] O.J. 
No. 108, [2006] O.T.C. 30 (Ont. S.C.J.) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in identifying 
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Justices Caldwell and Cameron agreed that because of its potential to 
reveal detailed and intimate information about lifestyle and personal 
choices, subscriber information generally attracts a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.
107
 But Caldwell J.A. (and not Cameron J.A.) 
found that this expectation was extinguished by Shaw’s service 
agreements and privacy policy, which warn customers that Shaw may 
disclose personal information to law enforcement.
108
 Justice Cameron 
would have found that there was a reasonable expectation of privacy, 
but held in any event that the disclosure was reasonable under 
section 487.014(1) of the Criminal Code.
109
 Justice Ottenbreit, in 
contrast, rejected the notion that subscriber information was sufficiently 
intimate or revealing to attract a reasonable expectation of privacy. “The 
potential that the Disclosed Information might in this case eventually 
reveal much about the individual and the individual’s activity ...”, he 
reasoned, is “neither here nor there”.110 
The Supreme Court concluded that the subscriber information 
attracted a reasonable expectation of privacy, that statute and contract did 
                                                                                                             
information of postal box customer); R. v. James, [2013] O.J. No. 3591 (Ont. S.C.J.) (no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in name and account number associated with suspicious financial transactions); 
R. v. Siemens, [2011] S.J. No. 406 (Sask. Prov. Ct.) (no reasonable expectation of privacy in name of 
driver who rented car). American courts have almost universally rejected the notion that there is a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in Internet subscriber information. See, e.g., United States v. 
Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, at 1204-1205 (10th Cir. Kan. 2008); United States v. Bynum, 604 F.3d 161, 
at 164-65 (4th Cir. 2010); United States v. Stults, 575 F.3d 834, at 842-43 (8th Cir. Neb. 2009).  
106  Supra, note 11. At the same that it decided Spencer, the Court released its decision in 
Trapp, supra, note 103, in which a differently constituted court split two ways in a similar case. As 
in Spencer, Cameron J.A. (Jackson J.A., concurring) held that the accused had a reasonable 
expectation of privacy but that the search was reasonable. The remaining judge in Trapp, Ottenbreit J.A., 
concluded as he did in Spencer that there was no such expectation. 
107  Spencer, id., at paras. 22-27, Caldwell J.A., para. 98, Cameron J.A. Justice Caldwell also 
noted at paras. 34-42 that disclosure was permitted under PIPEDA. 
108  Id. 
109  This conclusion, which Cameron J.A. elaborated more fully in Trapp, supra, note 103, 
is clearly incorrect and was rejected by the Supreme Court in Spencer, id., at paras. 71-73. 
Section 487.014(1) simply states that, “[f]or greater certainty,” police do not require a production 
order to “ask a person to voluntarily provide to the officer documents, data or information that the 
person is not prohibited by law from disclosing.” Since the provision does not create a police power 
to obtain the data (but merely confirms the general principle that police may seek people’s voluntary 
cooperation to obtain investigative information), and since it imposes no limits on police’s ability to 
do so, it cannot be said to authorize the disclosure. So, if the information obtained attracted a 
reasonable expectation of privacy (and thus constituted a “search or seizure”), its disclosure to police 
was not authorized by law and accordingly cannot be “reasonable” under s. 8. See also Ward, supra, 
note 102, at para. 50: “With respect to the contrary opinion reached by the majority in Trapp, at  
para. 66, I do not read s. 487.014(1) as creating or extending any police search or seizure power.” 
110  Spencer, id., at para. 110 (emphasis in original). 
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not extinguish this expectation, and that the police’s acquisition of the 
information was unreasonable under section 8 because it was not 
authorized by law. Though the appeal was dismissed (because the Court 
ruled that the evidence should not be excluded under section 24(2) of the 
Charter), henceforth police will not be able to obtain subscriber 
information by request from service providers.  
Spencer implicates each of the three digital section 8 doctrines 
discussed above: (1) the technological nature of the investigative 
technique; (2) the effect of contract and statute in shaping reasonable 
privacy expectations; and (3) the application of the “biographical core” 
test to a type of information that some consider highly intimate and 
others not. In the context of subscriber information requests, (1) is so 
intimately related to (3) that I discuss them together. I therefore begin 
with (2).  
2.  Contract and Statute 
Echoing Deschamps J.’s view in Gomboc, Cromwell J. held for a 
unanimous Court that contractual and statutory norms “may be relevant 
to, but not necessarily determinative of whether there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy”.111 Indeed, in Spencer he found that these norms 
had little value in determining the reasonableness of the appellant’s 
expectation of privacy.
112
 The relevant contractual provisions were 
“confusing and equivocal”, he wrote, and the statutory framework was 
“not much more illuminating”.113 Ultimately, he concluded that by 
incorporating PIPEDA by reference, the contractual framework 
permitted non-consensual disclosures only when authorized by law, 
which simply begs the question of whether a police request for voluntary 
disclosure invades a reasonable expectation of privacy under section 8 of 
the Charter.
114
 In this case at least, contract and statute led to a 
tautology.
115
 
                                                                                                             
111  Spencer SCC, supra, note 11, at para. 54.  
112  Id., at para. 55: “[T]he relevant provisions provide little assistance in evaluating the 
reasonableness of Mr. Spencer’s expectation of privacy.” 
113  Id., at para. 60. 
114  Id., at para. 65: “The overall impression created by these terms is that disclosure at the 
request of the police would be made only where required or permitted by law.” 
115  See id., at para. 63 (characterizing the relevant PIPEDA provisions (discussed further, 
infra, at notes 117-120 and accompanying text) as involving an “essential circularity”). 
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The Court’s reluctance to put much weight on either statutory or 
contractual norms in deciding whether there was a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in subscriber information was amply warranted. Consider first the 
statutory context. As mentioned, PIPEDA permits (but does not require) the 
organizations it governs to disclose personal information to police for law 
enforcement purposes. Both Caldwell J.A. in Spencer
116
 and Doherty J.A. in 
Ward
117
 found this to militate against finding a reasonable expectation of 
privacy. As discussed, however, section 8 guarantees a realm of privacy 
protection as against the state irrespective of state efforts to circumscribe 
privacy.
118
 It is difficult to reconcile this “normative” conception of section 8 
with one that permits privacy expectations to be diminished by statute.  
It also makes little sense to read PIPEDA, which was designed to 
enhance individual privacy vis-à-vis non-state entities, as restricting 
individual privacy vis-à-vis the state.
119
 Before PIPEDA and its provincial 
counterparts were enacted, police were free to request personal information 
from third parties, and absent legal process compelling disclosure (like a 
warrant), third parties were generally free to decide whether to comply. 
PIPEDA has not changed this. The law enforcement exemptions in 
PIPEDA and its analogues should not therefore be interpreted as militating 
either for or against recognizing a reasonable expectation of privacy.
120
  
Contract presents a somewhat more difficult case. As noted by Doherty 
J.A. in Ward, to the extent that service agreements and privacy policies are 
binding, they are paradigmatically contracts of adhesion.
121
 There is 
considerable diversity among providers and their privacy policies. But given 
the dominant market share of the largest few;
122
 the uniformity of terms;
123
 
                                                                                                             
116  Id., at para. 41. 
117  Ward, supra, note 102, at paras. 100-104. 
118  See discussion supra, note 91 and accompanying text See also Spencer, supra, note 11, at 
para. 18. 
119  See contra Teresa Scassa, “Information Privacy in Public Space: Location Data, Data 
Protection and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” (2010) 7 Can. J. Law & Tech. 193, at 205 
[hereinafter “Scassa”] (“If data protection legislation gives an open-ended discretion to companies to 
disclose personal information to police without the data subject’s consent, and without need for 
judicial authorization, a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy in this information would 
certainly seem to be diminished.”). 
120  See Penney, Rondinelli & Stribopoulos, supra, note 12, at paras. 3.78-3.80; R. v. Chehil, [2009] 
N.S.J. No. 515, 248 C.C.C. (3d) 370 (N.S.C.A.), affd [2013] S.C.J. No. 49, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 220 (S.C.C.).  
121  Ward, supra, note 102, at paras. 52, 106. See also Gomboc, supra, note 35, at para. 33, 
Deschamps J.; Spencer, supra, note 11, at para. 54. 
122  See Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission, “Communications 
Monitoring Report 2013: Telecommunications service industry,” § 5.3, online: <http://www.crtc. 
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and the length, complexity, and frequent amendment of those terms,
124
 it is 
questionable whether consumers have much bargaining power with respect 
to their privacy.
125
  
On the other hand, if consumers really do value the privacy of their 
subscriber information, the market would arguably respond 
accordingly.
126
 On this view, the fact that the big providers permit 
disclosure speaks to the low value customers actually place on this aspect 
of their privacy.
127
 Assuming a competitive marketplace and a reasonable 
measure of information symmetry,
128
 consumers’ acquiescence with these 
terms could plausibly count against recognizing a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in subscriber information.
129
 
It is not clear which of these arguments is stronger. In the face of this 
uncertainty, the most sensible position may be to consider contractual 
terms, but be cautious before giving them much weight, especially when 
the information obtained is unequivocally intimate.
130
 But in cases where 
the information is not especially sensitive (or is only debatably so), 
contractual terms clearly limiting privacy expectations may help sway the 
balance against section 8 protection, absent evidence of market failure. 
3.  Subscriber Information and the Biographical Core  
Given the ambiguity and circularity of the statutory and contractual 
framework, the most critical determinant in Spencer was the Court’s 
                                                                                                             
gc.ca/eng/publications/reports/policymonitoring/2013/cmr5.htm> (the top five major Internet Service 
Providers captured 76 per cent of the market in 2012). 
123  See Morin, supra, note 103, at 16-17 (compiling cases where courts have concluded that 
providers’ customer agreements permit non-consensual disclosure of customer information to law 
enforcement) and 18-19 (finding such disclosure permitted under contemporary agreements). 
124  See Scassa, supra, note 119, at 211. 
125  See Ward, supra, note 102, at para. 106. 
126  See Adam Thierer, “A Framework for Benefit-cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates” 
(2013) Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1055, at 1071-76 [hereinafter “Thierer”]. 
127  See Alessandro Acquisti, “The Economics of Personal Data and the Economics of Privacy: 30 
Years after the OECD Privacy Guidelines”, Paper #3 (December 2010) Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, online: <http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/46968784.pdf> (surveying 
research showing willingness to disclose sensitive information for small rewards); Bettina Berendt, Oliver 
Günther and Sarah Spiekermann, “Privacy in e-commerce: Stated preferences vs. actual behavior” (2005) 
48 Communications of the ACM 101 (experiment revealing divergence between privacy preferences and 
behaviour); Evelien van de Garde-Perik et al., “Investigating Privacy Attitudes and Behavior in Relation to 
Personalization” (2008) 26 Social Sci. Computer Rev. 20, at 35-36, 39 (same). 
128  See Thierer, supra, note 126, at 1071-72. 
129  See Ward, supra, note 102.  
130  See Scassa, supra, note 119, at 212. 
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measurement of the intrinsic intimacy of subscriber information, i.e., 
whether it comprises part of the “biographical core” typically protected 
by section 8 of the Charter. On the face of it, it is difficult to see how a 
customer’s name, address, or other identifying information (such as a 
telephone number, e-mail address or username) would reveal intimate 
details of people’s lifestyles or personal choices, even if the information 
is not publicly available.
131
 But police obviously did not want the 
subscriber information for its own sake. Rather, they wanted it to help 
discover the identity of the person downloading child pornography.
132
 
The question then is whether piercing an Internet user’s anonymity in 
these circumstances presents such a risk to privacy as to demand 
constitutional protection. The courts and commentators who have answered 
“yes” to this question have offered two major arguments. The first is that 
the particular information obtained by police, i.e., the (likely) identity of a 
person observed to have accessed child pornography, revealed “intimate 
details of the lifestyle and personal choices of the individual”.133 The 
argument, in other words, is that use of child pornography is itself protected 
information, because it is an activity typically conducted in secrecy that 
people would not wish others to know about. The fact that possession and 
distribution of child pornography are criminal offences is immaterial: the 
activity is (almost by definition) intimate, so it deserves protection. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Canada has sustained this 
argument, albeit in less emotionally fraught circumstances than child 
pornography.
134 
As I have argued more extensively elsewhere, however, this 
principle is dubious.
135
 There is an argument that courts should sometimes 
                                                                                                             
131  See Hubbard, Magotiaux & Proestos, supra, note 101, at 370-71, 373, 383-87. This is not 
to say that an individual’s identity can never attract a reasonable expectation of privacy. In some 
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132  See Ward, supra, note 102, at para. 68; Spencer, supra, note 11, at para. 19, Caldwell J.A.; 
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Disclosure of Subscriber Information in Online Child Exploitation Investigations” (2011) 57 Crim 
L.Q. 486, at 500-503. 
133  Spencer, id., at para. 22, per Caldwell J.A. 
134  See Gomboc, supra, note 35, at paras. 7-15, 34-43, per Deschamps J.; paras. 80-82, per 
Abella J., concurring; and paras. 123-129, per McLachlin C.J.C. and Fish J., dissenting; R. v. Kang-Brown, 
[2008] S.C.J. No. 18, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 456, at para. 58 (S.C.C.), per Binnie J.; at para. 175, per 
Deschamps J., dissenting; and at para. 227, per Bastarache J., dissenting; A.M., supra, note 14, at 
paras. 38, 67-73, per Binnie J.; and paras. 157-158, per Bastarache J., concurring; Patrick, supra, 
note 38, at para. 32. 
135  See Penney, “Novel Search Technologies”, supra, note 88; Penney “Cost-benefit”, supra, 
note 93, at 806-807. 
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use procedural law (like privacy rights) to constrain the enforcement of 
arguably unwise substantive offences.
136
 But given the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncements about the evils of child pornography offences (including 
simple possession),
137
 this argument did not seem tenable in Spencer, and 
indeed, the Court did not advert to it.
138
 Put bluntly, it sounds (and is in fact) 
perverse to interpret section 8 to protect subscriber information to preserve 
people’s liberty to trade child pornography anonymously.  
The second argument is more viable and was the one endorsed by the 
Court in Spencer. By obtaining Mr. Spencer’s subscriber information, 
Cromwell J. suggested, police could potentially observe his online 
activity in a more sustained and general way. Though he was far from 
precise in detailing the nature of this potential surveillance, Cromwell J. 
concluded that any request for subscriber information that corresponds to 
“specifically observed, anonymous Internet activity engages a high level 
of informational privacy”.139  
Justice Cromwell is far from alone in fearing that subscriber 
information may give police access to reams of intimate information 
beyond the discovery of criminal activity. Many other jurists have made 
the same claim.
140
 If this is true, unregulated police access to subscriber 
                                                                                                             
136  Id. 
137  See R. v. Sharpe, [2001] S.C.J. No. 3, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, at paras. 28, 82, 85-94 (S.C.C.) 
(recognizing significant risk that possession of child pornography increases the risk of child abuse). 
138  On this question, the Court stated only that the “nature of the privacy interest does not 
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not whether Mr. Spencer had a legitimate privacy interest in concealing his use of the Internet for the 
purpose of accessing child pornography, but whether people generally have a privacy interest in 
subscriber information with respect to computers which they use in their home for private 
purposes…”. Spencer SCC, supra, note 11, at para. 36. This statement simply reaffirms the 
uncontroversial principle that the discovery of illegality does not retrospectively justify intrusions 
that could have revealed intimate but legal activity. It does not support the idea, criticized above, that 
governmental intrusions revealing illegal activity should be regulated under s. 8, even if they are 
extremely unlikely to reveal intimate, legal activity. 
139  Id., at para. 51. See also id., at para. 32: “The subject matter of the search was not simply 
a name and address of someone in a contractual relationship with Shaw. Rather, it was the identity of 
an Internet subscriber which corresponded to particular Internet usage.” 
140  See Spencer, supra, note 11, at paras. 22-27, per Caldwell J.A.; Stanley A. Cohen, 
Privacy, Crime and Terror: Legal Rights and Security in a Time of Peril (Markham, ON: 
LexisNexis Canada, 2005), at 533; Slane, supra, note 104: Scassa, supra, note 119, at 218; Daphne 
Gilbert, Ian R. Kerr & Jena McGill, “The Medium and the Message: Personal Privacy and the Forced 
Marriage of Police and Telecommunications Providers” (2007) 51 Crim. L.Q. 469, at 487-89; Jennifer 
Stoddart, Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Customer Name and Address (CNA) Information 
Consultation Document: Response of the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada to Public 
Safety Canada” (October 2007) online: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada <http:// 
www.priv.gc.ca/information/pub/lar_071108_e.pdf>, at 6. 
(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) THE DIGITIZATION OF SECTION 8 529 
information could indeed cause many of the privacy harms discussed 
above. But it is far from evident that this is correct. The evidence in 
Spencer and Ward, for example, showed that the subscriber information 
only allowed police to connect online activity with a likely user for brief, 
discrete periods of time.
141
 This linking gave police access very little 
additional information about that person’s online activities.  
Commentators have nevertheless suggested that subscriber 
information gives police the capacity to scour the Internet for detailed 
records of subscribers’ online activities.142 There is no evidence in 
the jurisprudence, however, that police have done this or have the 
ability to do so.
143
 As the cases illustrate, when police discover child 
pornography trading online, they can easily determine both the IP 
addresses of the traders and the service providers who assigned those 
addresses. But even assuming that an IP address remains attached to a 
particular subscriber for a significant period of time,
144
 there is no ready 
means of searching the Internet for any other activity associated with 
that address. 
The strongest argument that can be made for protecting subscriber 
information under section 8, then, is that it may be theoretically possible 
to use that information to engage in broader, unregulated surveillance of 
the subscriber’s (undeniably intimate) online activities.145 Since this 
possibility represents such a grave threat to privacy, the argument runs, 
courts should impose a bright line rule prohibiting unregulated access to 
subscriber information despite the fact that the information revealed in 
                                                                                                             
141  See Ward, supra, note 102, at para. 69: “I would say that the police sought information 
capable of putting the appellant at a specific place, at a specific time in the course of his travels on 
the Internet.”  
142  See, e.g., Mitch Koczerginski & Graham Mayeda, “They Promise They Won’t Be Evil ... 
But Should Google Still Be Your Friend After R v Ward? (November 2013), online: <http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=2362933>. 
143  See Ward, supra, note 102, at para. 18: “[T]he evidence in this case does not support the 
contention that IP addresses are unique to individual subscribers or that combining an IP address 
with subscriber information allows the police to compile a history of a person’s activity on the 
Internet. On this record, what is revealed is more in the nature of a snapshot than a history of one’s 
Internet activity.” 
144  In fact, in most cases users are assigned “dynamic” IP addresses that are reassigned after 
every connection to the Internet. See Joshua J. McIntyre, “Balancing Expectations of Online 
Privacy: Why Internet Protocol (IP) Addresses Should Be Protected As Personally Identifiable 
Information” (2011) 60 DePaul L. Rev. 895, at 900-902. 
145  See Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “What an IP Address Can Reveal 
About You” (May 2013), online: <https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/research-recherche/2013/ip_ 
201305_e.pdf>.    
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the actual cases before them is mundane. Though not stated explicitly, 
this appears to be the rationale behind the Court’s decision in Spencer. 
The Court had previously rejected this kind of argument, however, in 
what is still the leading decision on the reasonable expectation of privacy 
question: R. v. Tessling. As Binnie J. stressed for a unanimous Court 
there, “the reasonableness line has to be determined by looking at the 
information generated by existing … technology, and then evaluating its 
impact on a reasonable privacy interest”.146 If the technology at issue 
changes, he added, “courts will have to deal with its privacy implications 
at that time in light of the facts as they then exist”.147  
Justice Binnie’s reluctance to extrapolate from demonstrated existing 
technical capacity in Tessling was wise. As many commentators have 
noted, appellate courts are generally unsuited to the task of regulating 
complex and rapidly shifting technologies.
148
 They deal with only that 
tiny fraction of uses of a technology that have been litigated to appeal 
(often years after the technology has been superseded); hear only the 
voices of advocates (including any interveners); and are largely limited 
to the evidentiary record developed at trial, with only very restricted 
capacities to engage with independent, technical expertise.
149
  
All of this suggests that the Supreme Court may have been too eager 
to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in Spencer, especially if 
doing so would mean that police would need warrants to obtain 
subscriber information (even on reasonable suspicion). While police may 
have grounds to obtain such warrants in many cases (including on the 
facts of Spencer), in many others they may not. Police often need to 
obtain subscriber information attaching to computer modems/routers, 
mobile phones and other digital devices at very early stages of an 
investigation to develop leads, rule out suspects, ensure public safety and 
                                                                                                             
146  Supra, note 30, at para. 29. 
147  Id. 
148  See Stephen Breyer, “Our Democratic Constitution” (2002) 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 245, at 261-63 
[hereinafter “Breyer”]; Orin S. Kerr, “The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional 
Myths and the Case for Caution” (2004) 102 Mich. L. Rev. 801, at 875-76 [hereinafter “Kerr, ‘Fourth 
Amendment’”]; see also Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, “Interpretations and Institutions” (2003) 
101 Mich. L. Rev. 885; William J. Stuntz, “Accountable Policing” (Harvard Public Law Working Paper 
No. 130, 2006), online: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=886170>. 
149  See Stuart Minor Benjamin, “Stepping Into the Same River Twice: Rapidly Changing 
Facts and the Appellate Process” (1999) 78 Tex. L. Rev. 269; Kerr, “Fourth Amendment”, id., at 
875-76; Breyer, id., at 261-63. 
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develop grounds to obtain search warrants or wiretap authorizations.
150
  
A warrant requirement would impede these efforts with little countervailing 
benefit to people’s privacy.  
Failing to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in Spencer, 
moreover, would not likely have opened the door to broader and more 
intrusive surveillance. First, section 8 of the Charter would likely apply 
to any governmental efforts to use subscriber information to 
systematically track online activities or conduct data mining with respect 
to identifiable persons.
151
 As discussed, in Spencer and analogous cases 
police did not use subscriber information for these purposes. If 
reasonable privacy expectations are invaded by the state’s acquisition of 
any information that might later be used for intrusive surveillance, 
almost any inquiry would trigger section 8 protection, severely 
hampering law enforcement.
152
  
Second, if there is a need for systematic, prospective regulation of state 
access to subscriber records, Parliament is well placed to intervene. 
Compared to courts, legislatures are more directly responsive to people’s 
preferences and can seek input from a much greater range of sources, 
including law enforcement, industry, advocacy groups, academics, technical 
experts and the general public.
153
 And though the legislative process may 
sometimes be skewed (on the one hand, by the outsized influence of well-
organized and deep-pocketed lobbies; and on the other, by the discounted 
influence of unpopular minorities),
154
 there is little evidence that such bias 
has worked against the protection of online privacy.  
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Many commentators have argued that legislatures protect the privacy 
and liberty interests of criminal suspects, who are disproportionately 
poor, mentally ill and members of racial minorities.
155
 Courts may 
therefore be justified in using expansive constitutional interpretations to 
regulate police-citizen encounters,
156
 especially the kinds of recurring, 
street-level interactions empirically associated with discriminatory 
profiling and other abuses.
157
 But when a surveillance technology is 
perceived to threaten the privacy of broad or powerful segments of 
society, legislatures have often been responsive.
158
 This is almost 
certainly the case with requests for subscriber information and many 
other Internet-related investigative tools. In recent years, the federal 
government (under both Liberal and Conservative regimes) has proposed 
several Bills that would have enhanced law enforcement’s abilities to 
obtain information from the digital realm, including provisions to compel 
the production of subscriber information.
159
 In each case vigorous 
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lobbying by privacy groups helped to kill the proposals.
160
 There does 
not seem to be a need, therefore, for courts to constitutionalize protection 
for subscriber information to correct defects in the majoritarian political 
process.  
Thankfully, however, the Spencer Court did not foreclose the 
possibility of a legislative response that could restore law enforcement’s 
capacity to obtain subscriber information without a warrant. Recall that 
to cohere with section 8, any intrusion on a reasonable privacy 
expectation (i.e., a “search or seizure”) must be “authorized” by statute 
or at common law. Since there was no statutory or common law authority 
to obtain the subscriber information in Spencer, the Court simply 
concluded that the search was not authorized by law and hence was 
unreasonable.
161
 This leaves room for a “dialogical” response by 
Parliament that would regulate warrantless access to subscriber 
information.
162
 The lawful access Bills mentioned above, for example, 
included audit, usage, reporting and record-keeping requirements that 
would have greatly limited the possibility of racial profiling
163
 or 
systematic data mining.
164
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The digital age is upon us, and the law of search and seizure and 
section 8 of the Charter must inevitably adapt. But meeting this challenge 
should not require a dramatic overhaul of the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
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existing digital section 8 jurisprudence. The Court has already 
recognized the distinctiveness of digital devices, stressed the importance 
of maintaining privacy in third party records, and exhibited a reluctance 
to erode the normative core of section 8 by reference to extrinsic norms. 
In future cases, however, it is hoped that in refining the meaning of 
“biographical core” information, the Court will rethink its position on the 
protection of purely criminal information, focus on the actual (and not 
speculative) capacities of digital search and surveillance technologies, 
and be cognizant of its own informational limitations in seeking to 
regulate complex and changing technologies. 
 
